The military situation in Iran has shifted significantly following the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, as United States and Israeli forces continue air strikes against the Iranian regime. Analyst Can KasapoÄŸlu has assessed that Khamenei’s political influence had already diminished before his passing, with real power increasingly concentrated within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Over recent decades, the IRGC evolved from a protective force into the central authority of Iran’s security apparatus, operating independently from clerical oversight.
The removal of key figures such as IRGC Commander General Mohammad Pakpour, Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh, and Senior Military Advisor Ali Shamkhani has disrupted Iran’s command network. However, KasapoÄŸlu argues that strategic success for US and Israeli operations depends less on leadership decapitation and more on degrading Iran’s military infrastructure—particularly its missile and drone capabilities. He notes: “For dictatorships, replacing men is easier than rebuilding military infrastructure. Strategic success, therefore, lies in dismantling the machinery that sustains Tehran’s military operations.”
During the ongoing conflict, Iran has maintained a high operational tempo in missile launches. In just two days of fighting, air defenses in the United Arab Emirates reportedly intercepted 152 ballistic missiles aimed at regional targets. On February 28 alone, approximately 170 ballistic missiles were launched at Israel alongside hundreds of drones. These coordinated attacks suggest that despite leadership losses, Iran’s operational kill chain remains functional.
KasapoÄŸlu highlights that US and Israeli forces must prioritize destroying Iranian missile launchers and stockpiles to prevent depletion of their own interceptor inventories. He points out: “Air defense systems are not infinite. Military commanders have to consider their stocks, reload cycles, and industrial capacity.” The opening phase of Operation Epic Fury saw Israeli forces conduct around 700 combat sorties within 36 hours—reducing Iran’s stock of ballistic missile transporter-erector-launchers by about half—but challenges remain due to Iran’s extensive underground complexes built with North Korean assistance.
The conflict has also impacted global maritime trade through the Strait of Hormuz—a critical chokepoint for oil and liquefied natural gas shipments. Shipping activity through Hormuz has slowed or reversed as vessels reroute toward alternative passages like the Cape of Good Hope amid heightened risk perceptions.
Looking ahead, analysts are watching which Iranian political-military figures are spared by allied strikes as an indicator of future intentions toward postwar governance in Iran. Figures such as President Masoud Pezeshkian and hardliner Ali Larijani may play roles in any transition scenario. Additionally, the status of Artesh—the regular armed forces distinct from the IRGC—could be significant if it remains intact after hostilities.
In summary, KasapoÄŸlu outlines several key areas to monitor over the next three days:
– The pace and effectiveness of IRGC missile and drone operations
– The fate of senior Iranian leaders
– The survivability and mobility of Iranian missile launchers
– Signs of division between Artesh and IRGC units
– Disruptions to tanker flows through Hormuz
– Potential Hezbollah mobilization from Lebanon
“Target selection is strategic language, as is restraint,” KasapoÄŸlu states regarding allied decisions on whom or what not to strike. This approach may signal broader objectives focused on stability rather than transformation in postwar Iran.



