As debate continues over how the United States should allocate its military and diplomatic resources, some analysts have argued for a shift in focus toward the Indo-Pacific region at the expense of Europe. They suggest that Washington must reduce its involvement elsewhere to prepare for a possible confrontation with China, and that continued support for NATO and Ukraine has become too costly.
Supporters of this Pacific-first strategy acknowledge that China is a growing threat to US interests. However, critics argue that this approach overlooks the ongoing risks posed by Russia and underestimates Europe’s importance to US security—even in the Pacific context. The argument goes that separating Chinese and Russian threats could lead to negative outcomes in both regions, especially as Beijing supports Moscow’s war efforts against Ukraine.
“China will be a significant threat to US interests for the foreseeable future. US policymakers should plan for all contingencies, including a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. But just as a homeowner would be foolish to spend time buying insurance for a future flood while shrugging off a fire raging in the attic, the US should not ignore the ongoing war in Europe because of the threat of war in Asia,” states one analysis.
Russia’s activities are cited as evidence of an immediate threat: “Russia is waging a shadow war against the US and its allies. In addition to Vladimir Putin’s genocidal war against Ukraine, Moscow has conducted missions on Western soil, including assassinations, cyberattacks, influence operations, and sabotage of key infrastructure. Reports even suggest that Russia has conducted directed energy attacks against US and Canadian officials.”
The relationship between China and Russia is described as interconnected rather than separate: “China and Russia are not distinct threats but rather a single problem set. China is the decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine.” Recent reports indicate increased direct support from Beijing to Moscow through provision of materials such as nitrocellulose for ammunition production and engines for drones.
The outcome of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is seen as having global implications: “What happens in Europe does not stay in Europe. The outcome of Putin’s war against Ukraine matters for China’s moves against Taiwan and in the broader Pacific.” According to Admiral John Aquilino, former commander of US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), supporting Ukraine also serves as deterrence against Chinese aggression: “all that other money that is supporting the Ukraine problem set also provides a deterrent value for INDOPACOM… An inability for Russia to succeed is a deterrent for President Xi.”
Taiwan has contributed aid following Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, including donations toward rebuilding efforts at Ohmatdyt Children’s Hospital after it was hit by missile strikes earlier this year. Taiwanese officials have also emphasized how international support for Ukraine reinforces democratic resilience globally: “A display of unabated and unquestionable resolve to safeguard democracy does not detract from the defense of places such as Taiwan: in fact, it is a key deterrent against adventurism on Beijing’s part,” said Foreign Minister Joseph Wu.
On economic grounds, proponents note strong transatlantic ties benefit American prosperity; trade between US states and Europe surpasses trade with China in most cases. The transatlantic economy accounts for about one-third of global GDP by purchasing power parity. The majority share—over 62 percent—of foreign investment into America comes from European countries.
While calls exist for Europeans to take more responsibility within NATO, analysts argue American leadership remains central: “The US remains the essential nation in NATO… Without America’s conventional capabilities… NATO’s Article V would be less formidable.” European defense spending has increased recently; twenty-one out of thirty-two NATO members are expected to meet or exceed two percent GDP spending targets this year.
Concerns about shifting troops from Europe to Asia are addressed by pointing out current deployments are historically low compared with Cold War levels—less than 66,000 personnel today versus over 400,000 at their peak—and allied nations like Germany and Poland contribute financially toward hosting these forces.
Arguments suggesting aid to Ukraine undermines readiness in Asia are countered by testimony from military leaders who say equipment provided differs significantly between theaters. For example, much of what has been sent to Ukraine—such as armor—is not suited for Pacific operations dominated by naval power. At times when there is overlap (e.g., air defense systems), investments made due to aid packages have helped expand industrial capacity needed across both regions.
Regarding concerns about budget constraints limiting dual commitments abroad, historical data shows defense spending averaged higher percentages during previous periods facing fewer adversaries; currently it stands at about 3.4 percent compared with nearly 7.6 percent during much of the Cold War era (https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59126). Some lawmakers have proposed increasing defense allocations up toward five percent GDP (https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/2670/text).
Finally, public opinion on international engagement can be shaped by effective policy outcomes rather than being strictly limited; polling data shows attitudes fluctuate based on perceived success or failure abroad (https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/research/public-opinion-survey/lack-american-support-ukraine-may-not-last).
In conclusion, analysts warn that withdrawing support from European allies could weaken both transatlantic relationships and overall American security posture—including its position vis-à-vis China—in an era marked by competition among major powers.
