China is expected to become a nuclear peer of the United States by the early to mid-2030s, according to a new report. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is moving beyond its historical approach of maintaining only a minimal deterrent and is developing both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. These developments are aimed at producing not just military but also political and psychological effects.
The report states, “Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided to embark on such a rapid nuclear modernization not primarily because China wants to ‘win’ a nuclear exchange against the US. Rather, Beijing wants to create political and psychological effects that lead to enormously important strategic and military effects.”
It identifies several goals behind China’s strategy: degrading adversaries’ decision-making, weakening their will to fight, undermining public support for war, eroding governmental resolve from within, and supporting broader deterrence efforts.
“the CCP and PLA are using the rapid development of nuclear capability and related delivery systems to subdue the adversary and win without fighting,” the report notes.
Three key outcomes are highlighted: reinforcing Chinese strategic narratives in Asia, enhancing China’s ability to deter or coerce regional actors through escalation dominance, and undermining trust in U.S. extended deterrence among allies while deepening allied fears of abandonment.
The report explains that these objectives align with evolving Chinese concepts of strategic stability and deterrence. For China, stability means arrangements that benefit its geopolitical aims rather than simply preserving balance with other major powers.
“For the CCP and PLA, strategic deterrence is not only about deterring an adversary from a specific military course of action or policy. It also involves placing ongoing and enduring military and nonmilitary constraints on an adversary in a manner that is advantageous for the pursuit of China’s broader objectives,” according to the analysis.
Chinese nuclear modernization is seen as serving not just traditional deterrence but also as influencing the behavior of states lacking comparable capabilities—an approach described as asymmetric strategic stability.
Case studies in the report examine Chinese actions toward countries like the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea. The study concludes with several recommendations: move away from reliance on arms control agreements; maintain ambiguity regarding U.S. strategies; reinforce conventional allied rearmament supported by credible U.S. extended nuclear deterrence; avoid encouraging allies’ pursuit of independent nuclear arsenals; and engage more actively in psychological operations for strategic effect.
